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THE RELIGIONS OF COMTE AND SPENCER:
A NEW SYNTHESIS SUGGESTED/
BY CHARLES E. HOOPER.
SOME people might say that Comte and Spencer had no rehgions.
It is certain that they had no theologies. x\nd yet these two
remarkable prophets of the age of science were men of great
earnestness, and each thought that he had a religion. Each consid-
ered his own faith to be, not only true and reasonable in itself, but
a great improvement on Christian orthodoxy, and quite adequate
to satisfy the legitimate cravings of the human soul. But what
could be stranger than the contrast between the religious outlooks
of these two thinkers ; outlooks so much more incompatible than
their respective systems of philosophy?
Their philosophic systems are indeed very different, and yet
have much in common. They agree with one another and with the
writings of J. S. Mill, who occupies a somewhat intermediate
position, in a determined attempt to bring philosophy into line
with science, to found it anew on strictly scientific data, to limit
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recognized knowledge to the relations of phenomena and banish
all speculation on the older metaphysical and theological lines.
Both are dominated by the idea of a progressive and generally
ascending process of change in the universe, and both apply this
idea, though in different ways and with somewhat varying results,
to the growth of human knowledge and civilization. These two think-
ers were alike engaged in creating the science of sociology, although
they could not foresee, and we cannot foresee, its ultimate devel-
opments.
There are, however, some outstanding diff'erences of philo-
sophic method, which may partly account for the differences of re-
ligious outlook to which I must shortly allude. Spencer was a psy-
chologist—a student of the changeful combinations of sensation,
thought, emotion, and desire, as they appear in the diurnally re-
newed flow of conscious life. Comte eschewed psychology on prin-
ciple, regarding knowledge as a subjective synthesis made from the
point of view of humanity rather than from that of the individual
thinker. He accordingly started with logical discourse as the
common instrument of all human inquiries, and with the "positive"
method of employing this instrument.
Again, Spencer was a strong individualist in sociology, while
Comte was an ardent collectivist. Lastly, Spencer was bent on
applying a single mechanical law of evolution throughout the var-
ious spheres of natural knowledge ; while Comte emphasized the
unbridged (if not unbridgeable) diff'erences between the points of
view of the chief sciences. According to him each of the transi-
tions from mathematics to physics, physics to chemistry, chem-
istry to biology, biology to sociology, if not also that from sociol-
ogy to ethics, involves the bringing in of fresh data, with a new
and higher scientific outlook. The top rung of his "ladder of the
sciences"—the moral or moral-sociological point of view— is that
from which he habitually looks forth.
Let us now glance at Comte's religion, with its characteristic
differences from Christian orthodoxy on the one hand and ab-
stract ethicism on the other. It is clear that we have no positive
knowledge of individual objects higher in the scale of being than
men and women ; but human persons dift'er enormously in phy-
sique, in mental endowment, and in moral character, so that the
highest individual object we can conceive is not a human being,
as such, but what we take to be the best type of—or the ideal
—
human being.
Most Christians suppose that Jesus, the Messiah, was a morally
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ideal man, and there are some rationalizing Christians who hold
that his ideal humanity constitutes his whole title to divinity. For
Comte, however, Jesus was simply one of the great and good re-
formers of morals and religion who have, from time to time, ap-
peared in the world. His character, like that of every one else,
was partly due to his natural ancestry, and partly due to the human
environment and circumstances into which he was born, and to
which his thoughts and feelings reacted more strongly and fruit-
fully than those of a lesser man would have done.
All men and women of historical eminence are moulded in
mind and character (though not independently of their own con-
scious activity) by the social influence of their contemporaries ; but
they are also powerfully afifected by that of their forerunners,
through the standard literature and traditions, and the creations
of art and industry, to which they have access. The really valuable
and permanent elements of culture, which are passed on from
century to century and extended from nation to nation, are a
product not solely of the more celebrated individuals with whose
names many of them are connected. They are also a result of
the upward strivings of the great mass of human beings who think
not only of what concerns themselves, but also of what is good for
others or for all men. Very many of these people contribute
directly to the common stores of knowledge, art, and practical
wisdom, without attaining notoriety ; and all of them exercise a
subtle influence in spurring the greater geniuses to achieve the
best that is in them.
From these and like considerations Comte arrived at the con-
ception of a Great Being, Humanity, which is not merely the col-
lective multitude of living human individuals, but the efficient unity
of all men and women who have ever striven, however vaguely,
for the common good. The dead still cooperate with the living in
producing one great and growing historical fact: the collective life
of the nations to whom the earth belongs, headed by those powerful
nations of the West who inherit the science and art of Greece, the
legal and moral codes of Rome and Judea.
Humanity, taken in the above sense, is certainly the most
directly beneficent thing of which we have any clear knowledge
;
for its far-reaching and persisting influence is compact of the
varied achievements of all great personalities as well as of the
unobtrusive goodness of the multitude whose names are forgotten.
Comte, therefore, sought to institute a worship of this Humanity,
which we know positively though imperfectly, in place of the wor-
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ship of a God whom, according to him, we do not know at all.
And, be it said, this religion of Humanity may be valid in its way
and may survive in essence, even if the elaborate ritual with which
Comte sought to surround it, and which caused it to be humorously
described as Catholicism minus Christianity, cannot or should not
be put into practice. The small bodies of positivists who look up
to him as their spiritual master have among them thinkers who are
by no means incapable of criticizing and setting aside some of his
teaching, while it belongs to their avowed ideal to accept the later
advances in science and practice which the continued progress of
humanity must bring to light.
If Comte considered himself, and is considered by his followers,
to be the founder of a new era in human civilization, it must not be
forgotten that his whole teaching precludes the idea of there being
any miraculous prophet or sage whose authority ought to outweigh
the growing experience and science of mankind.
It will, I think, be admitted that, while humanity, taken in its
essential solidarity, is morally the grandest thing we know, human
selfishness and folly, human vindictiveness and depravity, are the
worst things knowable ; and we have only too much evidence of their
existence. Hence some people think that, if a strictly natural re-
ligion be possible, it should be a religion of pure ethics ; not of
humanity as such, but of what we are convinced is good in human
character and social relations ; no matter whether this good be
destined to triumph in the dim future or to be swallowed up in
the tragedy of a deteriorating world.
To this heroic type of ethicism a positivist might object that
it is the general consensus of enlightened opinion which causes
certain conduct and certain motives to be recognized as good, and
other conduct and motives as bad. Humanity, rather than the indi-
vidual, with his possibly and quite probably prejudiced type of
conscientiousness, is the arbiter, because it is the maker, of morality.
Moreover, there would be little inspiration for ethical religion if we
could not feel that mankind is in fact progressing in the direction
of true human betterment; that the passions which man inherits
from his animal ancestry, and still more perhaps from the ages of
tyrannical force, ruthless predatory warfare and savage superstition,
are indeed being brought under the strong control of rational and
humane sentiments, expressed in juster laws and better relations
between individuals, classes, and nations.
* * sit
Comte's doctrine of Humanity has made a much wider appeal
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to modern thought than is evidenced by the small band of his nom-
inal followers. It has doubtless exercised a powerful influence upon
theistic and Christian thinkers who are not too orthodox ; while, for
those who no longer believe in a superhuman providence or a divine
revelation, but who do believe in the gospel of human advancement,
it becomes an increasingly inspiring idea.
Many, however, cannot accept the religion of Humanity at
Comte's own valuation, because, while they are willing at times to
stand beside him on the top rung of the scientific ladder, and view
everything from the moral-sociological standpoint, they like also
to view things from some of the lower rungs which, strange to say,
give glimpses of a universe altogether greater than humanity
;
greater by the immensities of time and space ; by endless process
and limitless substance ; by boundless potentialities of form and
motion, life and consciousness. They discover that self-conscious
humanity is the child of savage races ; these the offspring of an
animal ancestry ; that, of more primitive types of life ; also that all
are children of mother earth, and earth dependent on the sovereign
sun and conditioned by the all-enfolding ether. Thus, while they
may recognize that the slowly integrating being of Humanity, ever
striving toward the good, is the thing most worthy to be worshiped
with love, they cannot withhold all veneration from those mysterious
sources of energy, life, and organic progress which have undoubt-
edly been necessary, even if they have not alone sufficed, to make
humanity all that it is, and all that it may become. To venerate
them as though they were human and moral would be mere anthro-
pomorphism ; but not to venerate them at all seems to disclose a
somewhat narrow attitude of self-satisfaction in human achieve-
ments. It is as if the child, mankind, were still in the womb of
primitive nature, conscious only of itself and caring nothing for the
mother who is to bring it forth ; whereas, the relative independence
of pre-sociological conditions which man undoubtedly possesses
argues his ability to reflect on pre-sociological nature, and to see
that it is indeed his mother and deserves some at least of his
reverence.
When we have learned to forgive nature for not being human
(which many people seem unable to do) we shall perhaps begin to
revere her for being what she is. This attitude might seem more
consonant with the robust monism of Professor Haeckel than with
Spencer's austere doctrine of the Unknowable ; and yet that doc-
trine undoubtedly assert? the value of an ultimate reality which is
not specifically human.
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The pervading mystery of the universe which meant little to
Comte's predominantly social spirit meant much to Spencer. He
came to suppose that science and religion might be ultimately recon-
ciled in the recognition of a great First Cause or Inscrutable Abso-
lute ; a reality underlying at once the facts of consciousness and the
facts of matter in motion, but not to be identified with either, nor
yet with both taken together at their phenomenal value. His re-
ligion is thus a sort of modern sphinx-worship ; but be it said with-
out sarcasm; for the sphinx was a profoundly symbolic mon-
ster. Probably I am not alone in thinking that where he erred
was in objectifying the pervading mystery of being under such
titles as Cause, Power, and Absolute, and supposing that it contrasts
radically with a sphere of phenomena which can be definitely
known ; whereas the very fact of knowing, in the true or intellec-
tual sense, involves a relation of subjective ideas and judgments to
some object-matter with which they are not commensurate; some-
thing which they mean but do not equate with or substantially re-
semble. The mystery of being is seen to lurk in all those things
that are called phenomena, and even in the simplest sensations,
when we try to understand them in their manifold real relations,
and do not satisfy ourselves with the familiarity of their names, as
though this familiarity were true knowledge of them.
It is fairly certain that the chapters on the Unknowable in
Spencer's First Principles do not appeal strongly either to persons
of religious or to persons of scientific temperament. There are,
however, various incontrovertible truths contained in those chap-
ters, and if Spencer had contented himself with showing how many
of the questions which men formulate are verbal rather than con-
ceptual, and had preached, instead of the Inscrutable Absolute, that
Infinite Reality to which knozvledge is ever more nearly approxi-
mating, hut which thought can never fully represent, many who
withhold assent from his doctrine as it stands would have freely
gone along with him.
To the Christian believer, or to any believer in supernaturally-
grounded religion, the religions of Comte and Spencer must of
course both seem unsatisfactory. It is, however, from the point
of view of purely natural religion, and as making an appeal to the
rationalist rather than to the orthodox that they have to be seriously
considered.
Now it may be that the majority of rationalists are in fact,
if not in profession, secularists ; that they do not want a natural
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any more than they want a revealed, religion. Certain rationalists,
however, do feel that the individual soul should learn to link itself,
in love and reverence, with realities greater than itself. Some,
therefore, become positivists ; while others, who may be not less
zealous for human progress, reserve their religious emotion for
what transcends humanity ; for what they may, with Spencer, re-
gard as the unknowable Absolute, or may view simply as the
stupendous encompassing and indwelling mystery of nature. Each
of these sorts of natural religion seems to me somewhat one-sided.
Why should not the rationalist seek to unite the intimate worship
of Humanity, as the most intensively beneficent reality known to
him, with an imaginative veneration of that infinite Nature, in
which the life of humanity has not only its external setting but its
very being? Certainly there is a sense in which these two objects
of reverence may seem opposed. Nature contains so many forces
hostile to man and entails on man so many elements inimical to true
humanity. But man himself is after all a part of nature, and the
highest excellence of individual and social life can only be attained
in and through nature. The superiority of man to his subhuman
surroundings is not a superiority to that Reality which embraces the
subhuman and human alike.
Thus nature is not essentially, though it may be accidentally,
inimical to human ideals. Moreover, there is a third object of
possible natural religion to be considered; one which is identical
neither with nature nor with humanity, but is instrumental to our
knowledge of both. Whatever we realize either of humanity or of
nature over and above those inarticulate feelings for the good and
the beautiful which are best expressed by music and the fine arts,
is realized in that form of connected and mutually supported
thoughts which is fairly described by the familiar word reason.
This reason is not simply reasoning, still less is it mere arguing
;
it is just the clearest understanding and the truest judgment of
which we are personally capable. It is the circle of subjective ideas
and opinions which at once link up with one another and reach out
to an objective goal; be that some object of contemplation or of
passive feelings evoked by contemplation, or be it some practical
achievement which the moral sense approves and to which rational
reflection points the way.
A truer appreciation of humanity, a fuller conception of nature,
a humbler sense of that part of natural reality which lies beyond
present knowledge, a better ability to serve mankind socially or to
utilize the knowledge of physical forces for human good are all
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alike dependent on an increase of individual understanding, which
can be brought about only by training the person to think as
widely and earnestly, as carefully and impartially, as possible. Such
thinking, or exercise of reason, necessarily mediates between self
and humanity, self and nature, and even in some sense between
nature and humanity themselves. Must we not therefore consider
reason as being closely linked with these, its greatest objects ; a
third term in the supreme natural trinity? Does not reason also
deserve to be in some sort venerated? True, it does not possess the
moral dignity, the social fulness, and the inspiring appeal of human-
ity ; nor does it possess the infinite sublimity and manifold wonders
and charms of nature; but what were humanity and nature to us
without it? Simply nonentities!
I would therefore suggest that a reasonable religion for the
avowed rationalist is to venerate Nature, as the supreme but never
wholly revealed reality ; to love Humanity as his own higher self
and highest end ; to reverence Reason as the essential means to the
best that he can either think or do, and, in its collective exercise,
to the best conditions that humanity itself can achieve.
If natural religion can exist at all, it can only exist as the
complement of advancing knowledge. Whatever the inevitable
limitations of reason may be, there is nothing too high or too sacred
to be inquired into
;
provided the inquiry be, not a pursuit of argu-
ments in favor of some foregone conclusion, but a sincere quest
of truth, marked by willingness to relinquish or modify our old
beliefs in the light of stronger evidence and clearer understanding.
A religion of Reason can be approved only if it hearten us
to an ever-increasing exercise of the thing itself. The actual hard
work of scientific observation, experiment and induction, of schol-
arly research, and of logical rearrangement of ideas should of course
be undertaken in the mood of the workman, not in that of the
devotee. Moreover those persons who, without pretending to be
original investigators, would learn in broad outline what has actually
been ascertained as to the constitution of nature and the history
of mankind must be workmanlike in their studies, more especially
as there is, under our present system of education, a lamentable
dearth of sound instruction on these most important subjects.
We must really know something of the wonders of evolution,
cosmic and biological, and of natural law, before the sublime mys-
tery of Nature can become an object of religious feeling. We must
form some fairly distinct mental picture of the world-history of
which British history is only one comparatively modem and Amer-
628 THE OPEN COURT.
ican history a much more modern section, before the ideal-ward
striving spirit of Humanity, which has moulded all that is worth
living in our lives can become for us a great and imperious reality.
It is, however, when we clearly perceive what an absurdly
small distance can be traveled by personal knowledge toward con-
ceiving the infinite reality of Nature or measuring the essential
goodness and greatness of Humanity that natural religion may
well arise to supplement natural knowledge, without in any degree
supplanting scientific investigation or the patient learning of its
results.
How much of that religion should take the form of ceremonial
observance, or at least of the gathering together of like-minded
worshipers, and how much is best left to the individual soul or
to individual expression in poetry (which usually tends to view
Nature and Humanity with true reverence, and may be expected to
grow increasingly religious in this sense) is a question worth ask-
ing, though I shall not here attempt to answer it.
